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Precautionary borrowing and the credit card debt puzzle
Jeppe Druedahl
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Casper Nordal Jørgensen
University of Copenhagen and Danmarks Nationalbank
This paper addresses the credit card debt puzzle using a generalization of the
buffer-stock consumption model with long-term revolving debt contracts. Closely
resembling actual US credit card law, we assume that card issuers can always deny
their cardholders access to new debt, but that they cannot demand immediate re-
payment of the outstanding balance. Hereby, current debt can potentially soften
a household’s borrowing constraint in future periods, and thus provides extra liq-
uidity. We show that for some intermediate values of liquid net worth it is indeed
optimal for households to simultaneously hold positive gross debt and positive
gross assets even though the interest rate on the debt is much higher than the
return rate on the assets. Including a risk of being excluded from new borrow-
ing which is positively correlated with unemployment, we are able to simultane-
ously explain a substantial share of the observed borrower-saver group and match
a broad range of percentiles from the empirical distributions of credit card debt
and liquid assets.
Keywords. Credit card debt puzzle, precautionary saving, consumption.
JEL classification. D14, D91, E21.
1. Introduction
Beginning with Gross and Souleles (2002) it has been repeatedly shown that many
households persistently have both expensive credit card debt and hold low return liq-
uid assets. This apparent violation of the no-arbitrage condition has been termed the
“credit card debt puzzle,” and no resolution has yet been generally accepted (see, e.g.,
the surveys by Tufano (2009) and Guiso and Sodini (2013)).
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This paper suggests a new explanation of the puzzle based on precautionary borrow-
ing. We begin from the observation that credit card debt is actually a long-term revolving
debt contract. Specifically, under current US law the card issuer can cancel a credit card
at any time, and thus instantly stop the cardholder from accumulating additional debt.
However, the card issuer cannot force the cardholder to immediately pay back the re-
maining balance on the credit card. The cardholder is only required to pay the interest
on the outstanding balance, and the so-called minimum monthly payment (typically 1%
of the outstanding balance). Depending on the specific credit card agreement, the issuer
might be able to increase this minimum monthly payment somewhat, but basically the
credit card debt is transformed into an installment loan.1
We add such long-term revolving debt contracts, which are partially irrevocable from
the lender side, to an otherwise standard buffer-stock consumption model in the tradi-
tion of Carroll (1992, 1997, 2012). Hereby, households gain a motive for precautionary
borrowing because current debt potentially relaxes the borrowing constraint in future
periods. For equal (and risk-less) interest rates on debt and assets, households will al-
ways accumulate as much debt as possible, thus maximizing the option value of having
a large gross debt. In the more plausible case of a higher interest rate on debt than on
assets, there exists a trade-off between the benefit of the extra liquidity provided by the
debt and the net cost of the balance sheet expansion.
We further amplify the motive for precautionary borrowing by including risk regard-
ing access to credit in the model. Specifically, we assume that households with an out-
standing balance face an exogenous risk of being excluded from new borrowing, and
that this risk increases under unemployment. The US Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFBP) shows in its “CARD Act Report” that “over 275 million accounts were
closed2 from July 2008 to December 2012, driving a $17 trillion reduction in the total
[credit] line” (p. 56, CFPB (2013)). It is not clear to which extent this was a demand or
supply effect, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the credit card companies unilater-
ally changed their lending during the Great Recession, and that the supply effect thus
dominated. Thus, having a credit card closed seems to be something a rational house-
hold should fear. Naturally, households might have an outside option of opening a new
credit card at another issuer, but if a household is simultaneously hit by unemployment,
this might prove impossible.
Based on a careful calibration which matches the distributions of credit card debt
and liquid assets observed in the Survey of Consumer Finance 1989–2013 up to and be-
yond the 85th percentiles, we show numerically that there exists a range of intermediate
values of liquid net worth for which it is indeed optimal for a household to simultane-
ously hold positive gross debt and positive gross assets, even though the interest rate on
the debt is much higher than the return rate on the assets. This is especially true when
we assume that negative income shocks are positively correlated with a high risk of a
fall in the availability of new credit. The parametric robustness of our results is rather
strong, indicating that precautionary borrowing is central in understanding the credit
1We thank the National Consumer Law Center and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau for help in
clarifying the rules for us.
2In the sense that no new credit could be accumulated on these account.
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card debt puzzle. If credit access risk and/or income risk is calibrated to be negligible it
should, however, be noted that the precautionary borrowing channel can only explain a
small share of the puzzle group.
We are somewhat cautious in precisely quantifying the importance of precautionary
borrowing because our model for computational reasons does not include illiquid as-
sets (e.g., houses). The model is thus not able to match the empirical facts on total net
worth without muting the precautionary motive completely. Note, however, that Kaplan
and Violante (2014) have recently shown that a buffer-stock model with an illiquid as-
set, subject to transaction costs, can generate a significant share of wealthy hand-to-
mouth households while still matching total net worth moments. We hypothesize that
both poor and wealthy hand-to-mouth households would also rely on precautionary
borrowing, and that our results are thus at least qualitatively robust to extending our
model in this direction, but fundamentally this remains an open question.
The importance of going beyond one-period debt contracts has naturally been dis-
cussed before. Closest to our paper are Attanasio, Leicester, and Wakefield (2011), At-
tanasio, Bottazzi, Low, Nesheim and Wakefield (2012), Halket and Vasudev (2014) and
Chen, Michaux, and Roussanov (2015) who all introduce long-term mortgage contracts,
and Alan, Crossley, and Low (2012) who model the “credit crunch” of 2008 in terms of a
drying up of new borrowing (a flow constraint) instead of a recall of existing loans (the
typical change in the stock constraint).3
To the best of our knowledge, Fulford (2015) is the only other paper that investi-
gated the importance of multiperiod debt contracts for the credit card debt puzzle.4 Our
approach differs from his in a number of important ways. First and foremost, we have
a much richer specification of the risk regarding access to credit the households face.
In particular, we do not rely on the unrealistic assumption that all households face the
same risk of being excluded from new borrowing. Instead, we show that a sizable puz-
zle group can be explained even though only households not repaying their credit card
bill in full face a risk of being excluded from new borrowing. This furthermore helps
to explain why we empirically observe that a large share of households have neither
credit card debt nor liquid assets. Additionally, we allow the risk of losing access to new
borrowing to be positively correlated with unemployment and show that this is empir-
ically relevant and quantitatively important for explaining a sizable puzzle group. This
is especially important because we, in contrast to Fulford (2015), account for the forced
monthly repayments contained in standard credit card contracts and a more realistic
income process—with both permanent and transitory shocks and nonzero growth—
which otherwise considerably weakens the ability of the precautionary borrowing mo-
tive to explain a sizable puzzle group.
3Note that Alan, Crossley, and Low (2012) use the term “precautionary borrowing” (borrowing for a rainy
day) in a somewhat different fashion than we do because the second asset in their model is a high return
risky asset. This, for example, implies that wealthy households also blow up their balance sheet by taking
loans to invest in the risky asset.
4We were only made aware of the working paper version of his paper after writing the first draft of the
present paper.
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On a more technical note, the model we present in this paper explicitly, in contrast
to Fulford’s (2015) model, nests the canonical buffer-stock consumption model as a lim-
iting case, and can be solved by a state-of-the-art endogenous grid point method for
models with nonconvex choice sets. This is first beneficial because it allows us to con-
duct a range of important robustness tests, such as showing which preferences must
characterize puzzle households and that a sizable puzzle group can be explained for
a wide range of estimates for the risk of losing and regaining access to new borrowing.
Second, it prepares the ground for future research studying the precautionary borrowing
motive in more general consumption-saving models.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3
presents the model and describes the solution algorithm briefly. Some stylized facts are
presented in Section 4 to which the model is calibrated in Section 5. Section 6 presents
the central results, and central robustness tests regarding the specification of credit ac-
cess risk. The welfare gain of the potential for precautionary borrowing is quantified in
Section 7, and a battery of additional robustness checks are performed in Section 8. Sec-
tion 9 concludes. Some details are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Related literature
2.1 Empirical evidence
Gross and Souleles (2002) showed that in the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF)
and in a monthly sample of credit card holders from 1995–1998, almost all households
with credit card debt held low return liquid assets (e.g., they had funds in checking or
saving accounts). In itself, this might not be an arbitrage violation but could be a pure
timing issue if the interview took place just after pay day and just before the credit card
bill was due. However, a third of their sample held liquid assets larger than one month’s
income; without any further explanation this certainly seems to be an arbitrage viola-
tion.
Their result has been found to be robust to alternative definitions of the puzzle
group5 and stable across time periods (see Telyukova and Wright (2008), Telyukova
(2013), Bertaut, Haliassos, and Reiter (2009), Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014) and
Fulford (2015)). Telyukova (2013), for example, utilized certain questions in the SCF to
ensure that the households in the puzzle group had credit card debt left over after the
last statement was paid, and that they either only occasionally or never repay their bal-
ance in full. Recently, Gathergood and Weber (2014) have shown that the puzzle is also
present in UK data, and that the puzzle group also has many and large expensive install-
ment loans (e.g., car loans).6
5We denote the group of households simultaneously holding both liquid assets and credit card debt as
the puzzle group.
6Looking over the life cycle, the puzzle group is smallest among the young (below 30) and old (above
60). Puzzle households are typically found to be in the middle of the income distribution and have at least
average education and financial literacy. Many have sizeable illiquid wealth (e.g., housing and retirement
accounts). There is also some evidence of persistence in puzzle status, and in total it thus seems hard to
explain the puzzle as a result of simple mistakes or financial illiteracy.
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Across samples and time periods, the interest rate differential between the credit
card debt and the liquid assets considered has typically been around 8–12 percentage
points, and thus economically very significant. Depending on the correction for timing,
this implies that the net cost of the expanded balance sheets of the puzzle group has
been calculated to be in the range of 05–15% of household income.
2.2 Other theoretical explanations
A number of different rational and behavioral explanations of the credit card debt puz-
zle has been suggested in the literature. First, Gross and Souleles (2002) informally sug-
gested that a behavioral model of either self/spouse-control or mental accounting might
be necessary to explain the puzzle.7  Bertaut and Haliassos (2002), Haliassos and Re-
iter (2007), and Bertaut, Haliassos, and Reiter (2009) formalized this insight into an
accountant-shopper model where a fully rational accountant tries to control an impul-
sive (i.e., more impatient) fully rational shopper (a different self or a spouse). The shop-
per can only purchase goods with a credit card, which has an upper credit limit, and
the accountant thus has a motive to not use all liquid assets to pay off the card balance
in order to limit the consumption possibilities of the shopper. Gathergood and Weber
(2014) provided some empirical evidence that a large proportion of households in the
puzzle group appeared to be impulsive spenders and a heavy discounter of the future.
A fundamental problem with this solution of the puzzle, however, is that it is not clear
why the accountant cannot utilize cheaper control mechanisms such as adjusting the
credit limit or limiting the shopper’s access to credit cards. Furthermore, many house-
holds with credit cards also have debit cards, which imply that the shopper in practice
has direct access to at least some of the household’s liquid assets.
Second, beginning with Lehnert and Maki (2007), and continuing with Lopes (2008)
and latest Mankart (2014), it was suggested that US bankruptcy laws might make it op-
timal for households to strategically accumulate credit card debt in order to purchase
exemptible assets in the run-up to a bankruptcy filing. Even though state level variation
in the size of the puzzle group and exemption levels seems to support this explanation,
the empirical power seems limited because it is only relevant relatively shortly before a
filling.8 Moreover, many households in the puzzle group have both significant financial
assets (e.g., bonds and stocks) and nonfinancial assets (e.g., cars and houses), and gen-
erally few households ever file for bankruptcy. Finally, it is far from obvious that such a
motive for strategic accumulation of exemptible assets can explain the evidence from
the UK (see Gathergood and Weber (2014)), which generally has more creditor friendly
bankruptcy laws.
A third resolution of the puzzle has been presented by Telyukova (2013) (see also
Telyukova and Wright (2008) and Zinman (2007)). She argues that many expenditures
7Note that behavioral models with hyperbolic discounting and a present bias such as Laibson, Repetto,
and Tobacman (2003) can explain that households with credit card debt has illiquid assets, but not that they
hold fully liquid assets.
8Mankart (2014) noted that debt and cash-advances made shortly before the bankruptcy filing (60 or 90
days depending on the time period) are not dischargeable above a rather low threshold.
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(e.g., rent and mortgage payments) can only be paid for by using cash, and that house-
holds thus have a classical Hicksian motive for holding liquid assets despite having ex-
pensive credit card debt. The strength of this demand for liquidity is amplified in her
model by rather volatile taste shocks for goods that can only be paid for with cash (e.g.,
many home and auto repairs). It is, naturally, hard to identify these fundamentally un-
observed shocks, and their size in the data. A more serious empirical problem is that the
use of credit cards has become much more widespread in the last 30 years; in the model
this should imply a sharp fall in the size of the puzzle group not seen in the data. Adding
a (costly) cash-out option on the credit card to the model, as is now common, could also
further reduce the implied size of the puzzle group. In total, this demand for cash might
certainly be a contributing factor, but it seems unlikely that it is the central explanation
of the credit card debt puzzle. Finally, note that in a model with both a Hicksian motive
for holding liquid assets and a precautionary borrowing motive, the two would reinforce
each other.
3. Model
3.1 Bellman equation
We consider a continuum of potentially infinitely lived households, each characterized
by a vector, St , of the following state variables: end-of-period gross debt (Dt−1), end-
of-period gross assets (At−1), market income (Yt), permanent income (Pt), an unem-
ployment indicator, ut ∈ {01}, and an indicator for whether the household is currently
excluded from new borrowing, xt ∈ {01}. In each period, the households choose con-
sumption, Ct , and debt, Dt , to maximize expected discounted utility.
Postponing the specification of the exogenous and stochastic income process of Yt
and Pt to Section 3.3, the household optimization problem is given in recursive form as
V (St ) = max
DtCt
C
1−ρ
t
1− ρ +β ·Et
[
V (St+1)
]
 (3.1)
s.t.
At = (1+ ra) ·At−1 +Yt −Ct
(3.2)
− rd ·Dt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest
− λ ·Dt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
installment
+ (Dt − (1− λ) ·Dt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
new debt

Nt = At −Dt (3.3)
Dt ≤ max
{
(1− λ) ·Dt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
old contract
1xt=0 · (η ·Nt +ϕ · Pt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
new contract
}
 (3.4)
AtDtCt ≥ 0 (3.5)
where ρ is the relative risk aversion coefficient, β is the discount factor, ra is the (real)
interest rate on assets, rd is the (real) interest rate on debt, and λ ∈ [01] is the minimum
payment due rate. The discount factor includes an exogenous quarterly death proba-
bility of 1%; having mortality is technically necessary to ensure that the cross-sectional
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distribution of income is finite because there are permanent income shocks (see be-
low). Equation (3.2) is the budget constraint, (3.3) defines end-of-period (financial) net
worth, and (3.4) is the borrowing constraint. We only cover the case rd > ra, and denote
the optimal debt and consumption functions by D	(St ) and C	(St ).
Note that xt = 1 is denoted as having lost access to new borrowing because the bor-
rowing constraint then becomes Dt ≤ (1 − λ)Dt−1, such that the household cannot in-
crease its stock of debt beyond what previously has been accumulated, net of the forced
repayment. We assume that the risk of losing access and the chance of regaining it are
given by respectively
Pr[xt+1 = 1|xt = 0] =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if Dt = 0
πlosexw if Dt > 0 and ut+1 = 0
πlosexu if Dt > 0 and ut+1 = 1
(3.6)
and
Pr[xt+1 = 0|xt = 1] = πgainx∗  (3.7)
We thus assume that the risk of losing access to new borrowing is zero as long as the
household pays off its credit card bill in full each period, Dt = 0. Otherwise, for Dt > 0,
we assume that the risk of losing access to new borrowing is given by π losexw if the house-
hold is working, and πlosexu = χlose · πlosexw if the household is unemployed. For the cali-
bration, we denote the risk of losing access to new borrowing before conditioning on
unemployment by πlosex∗ . The chance of regaining access to new borrowing, once access
has been lost, is always given by πgainx∗ .
3.2 The borrowing constraint
Our specification of the debt contract is obviously simplistic, but it serves our purpose
and only adds one extra state variable to the standard model. If η> 0, asset-rich house-
holds are allowed to take on more debt, even though there is no formal collaterization.
We allow for gearing in this way to be as general as possible, and we use end-of-period
timing and update the effect of income on the borrowing constraint period-by-period
following the standard approach in buffer-stock models.9
The crucial departure from the canonical buffer-stock model is that we assume the
debt contract is partially irrevocable from the lender side. This provides the first term
(“old contract”) in the maximum operator in the borrowing constraint (3.4), implying
that a households can always continue to borrow up to the remaining principal of their
current debt contract (i.e., up to (1−λ)Dt−1). The second term (“new contract”) is a more
9Note that the alternative borrowing constraint Dt ≤ At + αPt has the undesirable implication that the
household in principle can choose an infinite large level of debt, Dt , if it keeps its consumption level, Ct ,
fixed, and saves all the borrowed funds in liquid assets, At . Similarly, the borrowing constraint Dt ≤At−1 +
αPt has the undesirable implication that the same accumulation of larger and larger balance sheets can
happen gradually over time; in this case, however, rd − ra > 0 ensures that we cannot have limt→∞Dt = ∞.
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standard borrowing constraint and only needs to be satisfied if the households want
to take on new debt (Dt > (1 − λ)Dt−1). Hereby, current debt can potentially relax the
borrowing constraint in future periods, and it thus provides extra liquidity. This implies
that it might be optimal for a household to make choices such that both Dt > 0 and
At > 0, that is, to simultaneously be a borrower and a saver.
In a model of one-period debt (i.e., λ= 1), it would never be optimal for a household
to simultaneously hold both positive assets and positive debt because the option value
of borrowing today would disappear. Consequently, it would not be necessary to keep
track of assets and debts separately and the model could be written purely in terms of
net worth.10 This would also imply that (3.4) could be rewritten as
Nt ≥ −1xt=0 ·ϕ1+η · Pt (3.8)
showing that our model nests the canonical buffer-stock consumption model of Carroll
(1992, 1997, 2012) in the limit case λ→ 1.
3.3 Income
The income process is given by
Yt+1 = ξ˜(ut+1 ξt+1) · Pt+1
Pt+1 = Γ ·ψt+1 · Pt
ξ˜(ut+1 ξt+1) =
⎧⎨
⎩
μ if ut+1 = 1
ξt+1 − u∗ ·μ
1− u∗ if ut+1 = 0
ut+1 =
{
1 with probability u∗
0 else
where ξt and ψt are respectively transitory and permanent mean-one log-normal in-
come shocks11 (truncated with finite lower and upper supports), and u∗ is the unem-
ployment rate.12
3.4 Solution algorithm
As the model has four continuous states, two discrete states, and two continuous
choices, it is not easy to solve, even numerically. We use a novel trick by defining the
following auxiliary variables:
Mt ≡ (1+ ra) ·At−1 − (rd + λ) ·Dt−1 +Yt (3.9)
10If Nt ≥ 0, then At =Nt and Dt = 0, and if Nt < 0, then Dt = −Nt and At = 0.
11Note that the expectation of Yt+1 conditional on information at time t thus is Γ · Pt .
12Throughout the paper, we will continue to interpret ut as unemployment, but it could also proxy for
a range of other large shocks to both income and consumption. This would relax the model’s tight link
between unemployment and a higher risk of a negative shock to the availability of new borrowing.
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Figure 1. Choice set (example of nonconvexity).
Dt ≡ (1− λ) ·Dt−1 (3.10)
Nt ≡ Nt|Ct=0 =Mt −Dt (3.11)
where Mt is market resources, Dt is the beginning-of-period debt principal, and Nt is
beginning-of-period net worth. Also, using the standard trick of normalizing the model
by permanent income13—denoting normalized variables with lower cases—we make
nt a state variable instead of mt (the standard choice). This speeds up the solution al-
gorithm substantially because a change in dt then only affects the set of feasible debt
choices. We hereby get that if the optimal debt choice is smaller than the current debt
principal, then all households with smaller debt principals will make the same choice if
it is still feasible, that is,
k< 1 : d	(dtnt)= d ≤ k · dt ⇒ ∀d ∈ [k · dtdt] : d	(dnt)= d
Further, if the new debt contract depends on current net wealth, η = 0, the choice set
might be nonconvex, as illustrated in Figure 1, using the following characterization of
the choice set:
dt ∈
[
max{−nt0}max{dtη · nt + 1xt=0 ·ϕ}
]
 (3.12)
ct ∈
[
0 c(xt dt nt dt)
]

(3.13)
c(xtdt nt dt)≡
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
nt + dt if dt ≤ dt
nt +min
{
dt
1
η
(1xt=0 ·ϕ− dt)
}
if dt > dt
13See the Appendix for the normalized model equations and details on the solutions algorithm for the
discretized model.
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This possible nonconvexity of the choice set and the general nonconcavity of the
value function due to the maximum operator in the borrowing constraint (3.4) imply
that the value function might not be everywhere differentiable. Despite this, a standard
variational argument implies that given a feasible debt choice, dt = d, any optimal in-
terior consumption choice (i.e., where ct < c(•)) must necessarily satisfy the standard
Euler-equation, that is,14
c	t (•)−ρ = β · (1+ ra) ·Et
[(
Γ ·ψt+1 · c	t+1(•)
)−ρ]
(3.14)
Sufficiency of the Euler-equation can then be ensured by numerically checking that it
does not have multiple solutions (see the Appendix).
Similar to Barillas and Fernández-Villaverde (2007), Hintermaier and Koeniger
(2010), Kaplan and Violante (2014), Iskhakov, Jørgensen, Rust, and Schjerning (2017),
and especially Fella (2014), the endogenous grid points method originally developed
by Carroll (2006) can thus be nested inside a value function iteration algorithm, with a
grid search for the optimal debt choice, speeding up the solution algorithm.15 The full
solution algorithm is presented in the Appendix.
3.5 Policy functions
Based on the calibration in Section 5, Figure 2 shows in which disjoint sets of states the
household with median preferences chooses to hold which types of portfolios.
The household chooses to hold assets only (at > 0, dt = 0) if its beginning-of-period
liquid net worth (nt ) is sufficiently high and to hold debt only (at = 0, dt > 0) if it is suf-
ficiently low. A high level of liquid net worth implies that the option value of holding
debt is zero as liquidity is not a problem. In contrast, with a low level of liquid net worth
the household has already borrowed so much that it either cannot borrow any more, or
the option value of more debt is not large enough to cover the net cost of expanding the
balance sheet.
The household chooses to have both debt and assets (at > 0 and dt > 0) or neither
of both (at = 0 and dt = 0) if its beginning-of-period liquid net worth is in between the
two extremes mentioned above. For high levels of liquid net worth within this range, the
household is at the zero kink in both dimensions because of the jumps in the interest
14The variational argument can be briefly presented as follows: Think of a household following the opti-
mal plans for consumption and debt. If the current consumption choice is interior, 0< ct < c(•), then the
household can adjust consumption today by a small amount  = 0 and adjust it tomorrow by −(1 + ra)
without violating neither the borrowing constraint nor making the debt choices today and tomorrow in-
feasible. In the limit for  → 0, the implied change in the expected discounted utility seen from period t
is the difference between the LHS and RHS of the Euler-equation (3.14) multiplied by the sign of . If this
difference is not exactly zero, it implies that there exists a small  = 0, which can increase the household’s
expected discounted utility. This would violate the assumption that the household is following the optimal
plans for consumption and debt. In sum, the Euler-equation (3.14) must necessarily hold with equality for
all optimal interior consumption choices. The necessity of the Euler-equation can alternatively be proven
using recent results from Clausen and Strub (2013) on envelope theorems for models with nonconvexities.
This approach is used by, for example, Fella (2014).
15On the precision and speed-up benefits of using EGM, see Jørgensen (2013).
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Figure 2. Implied group choice (ut = 0, xt = 0). Note: Using the calibration in Section 5, and for
a household with median preferences.
rate and in the risk of being excluded from new borrowing, and thus chooses to have
neither debt nor assets. For lower levels of liquid net worth, the household instead finds
it optimal to have both debt and assets because it is in a more fragile situation where
it needs to secure some precautionary funds. The utility value of this “puzzle” choice
is weakly increasing in the beginning-of-period debt principal (dt) because the house-
hold can then easily accumulate more debt in excess of what it needs to accumulate for
consumption purposes.
4. Stylized facts
In order to match our model to the data, Tables 1 and 2 present the central stylized facts
on the credit card debt puzzle using a methodology similar to Telyukova (2013). In con-
trast to Telyukova, however, we use the combined versions of the Survey of Consumer
Finance (SCF) from 1989 to 2013 instead of only focusing on 2001 as she does. We in-
clude all working age households with heads of ages 25–64 in our sample, and handle
inflation and real growth by expressing all monetary variables relative to the mean quar-
terly after-tax income in the survey year. Credit card debt (Dt ) is defined as the balance
due on the credit card after the last statement was paid. Liquid assets (At ) are defined
as the sum of checking and savings accounts plus idle money in brokerage accounts.
Liquid net worth is defined as liquid assets minus credit card debt (Nt =At −Dt ).
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Table 1. Stylized facts—shares, debt, and liquid assets.
Puzzle Borrower Saver Corner All
Percent
Share 251 48 460 240 1000
Relative to Mean Quarterly Income
Credit card debt, Dt (mean) 051 040 002 005 017
5th percentile 005 006 000 000 000
15th percentile 009 008 000 000 000
25th percentile 013 011 000 000 000
50th percentile 030 025 000 000 000
75th percentile 062 047 000 000 014
85th percentile 090 067 002 003 033
95th percentile 162 122 009 027 085
Liquid assets, At (mean) 060 001 188 003 102
5th percentile 005 000 006 000 000
15th percentile 008 000 010 000 001
25th percentile 011 000 015 000 003
50th percentile 024 001 043 000 017
75th percentile 056 002 122 002 060
85th percentile 086 003 212 003 113
95th percentile 193 004 611 010 333
Liquid net worth, Nt (mean) 009 −039 186 −003 086
5th percentile −131 −120 005 −012 −060
15th percentile −060 −065 009 −000 −010
25th percentile −033 −045 014 000 000
50th percentile −003 −023 041 000 007
75th percentile 023 −010 118 001 049
85th percentile 052 −007 209 002 102
95th percentile 155 −005 610 003 324
Source: Survey of Consumer Finance 1989–2013, all households with heads of ages 25–64 and nonnegative income. All calcu-
lations are survey weighted. The groups are defined in the text. Credit card debt is the balance due after the last statement was
paid. Liquid assets include checking and savings accounts plus idle money in brokerage accounts. Liquid net worth is defined
as credit card debt minus liquid assets. Income is after federal taxes calculated using the NBER TAXSIM program. All monetary
variables are expressed relative to the mean quarterly income of the survey year.
All working age households are divided into four subgroups. Households are in-
cluded in the “puzzle” group (or interchangeably the “borrower-saver” group) if they
report repaying their credit card balance off in full “only sometimes” or “never,” and have
both credit card debt and liquid assets in excess of a cut-off given by $500 in 2001 (as in
Telyukova) and otherwise adjusted with the change in mean after-tax income.16 In con-
trast, households are defined as pure “borrowers” if they report repaying their credit card
balance off in full “only sometimes” or “never,” and have credit card debt exceeding their
liquid assets plus the cut-off. Households are defined as pure “savers” if they have liquid
net worth in excess of their credit card debt plus the cut-off, while the remaining house-
holds are included in the “corner” group because they have both low levels of both debt
16This implies that the cut-off is constant at around 37% of mean quarterly after-tax income.
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Table 2. Stylized facts—additional dimensions.
Puzzle Borrower Saver Corner All
Relative to Mean Quarterly Income
After-tax income (mean) 114 063 152 049 113
25th percentile 067 036 059 021 044
50th percentile 099 056 099 037 079
75th percentile 140 083 157 062 129
Installment loans (mean) 089 067 053 034 058
25th percentile 000 000 000 000 000
50th percentile 042 021 000 000 001
75th percentile 126 098 068 030 077
Home value (mean) 1061 503 1399 318 1011
25th percentile 192 000 000 000 000
50th percentile 847 298 893 000 615
75th percentile 1466 755 1741 426 1351
Home equity (mean) 484 217 876 171 576
25th percentile 000 000 000 000 000
50th percentile 246 037 397 000 183
75th percentile 636 262 1040 154 676
Total net worth (mean) 1568 395 4540 405 2600
25th percentile 196 000 328 000 076
50th percentile 692 124 1209 045 547
75th percentile 1598 446 3372 294 1820
Source: Survey of Consumer Finance 1989–2013; see Table 1. Mortgages are not included installment loans.
and assets (or have similar amounts of both and report normally repaying their credit
card balance in full).17
The first row of Table 1 shows that approximately one in four households are in
the puzzle group according to our definition. Increasing or decreasing the cut-off nat-
urally reduces or enlarges the size of the puzzle, while dropping the requirement that
the households should report paying the balance off in full “only sometimes” or “never”
increases the puzzle group to about 31% of the sample. About 40% of the puzzle house-
holds have liquid assets in excess of their monthly after-tax income, and 70% have liquid
assets in excess of half of their monthly after-tax income.18 Figure 3 shows that the puz-
zle group share in the period 1989 to 2013 has fluctuated between 20 and 30% with some
evidence for a downward trend since 1998, though the Great Recession could be mud-
dying the picture somewhat.19
17In the working paper version, we only divided the households into three groups as in Telyukova (2013).
Here, we also include the “corner” group following the approach in Gorbachev and Luengo-Prado (2016).
Hereby, our results are also more comparable with theirs.
18See Telyukova (2013) and Fulford (2015) for further discussions of the size of the puzzle group. Fulford
(2015) estimated a puzzle group share of 40% looking only at households with a credit card and using a low
cut-off of 001% of income.
19The downward trend could be due to both measurement problems, changes in institutions such as
the increasing importance of electronic payments, or changes in interest rates and credit card laws and
agreements. We do not aim to explain this potential trend in the present paper.
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Figure 3. Group shares over time. Source: Survey of Consumer Finances 1989–2013; see Table 1.
Taking a closer look at the puzzle households, Table 1 shows that the median puz-
zle household has approximately zero net worth, and credit card debt and liquid assets
equal to about one month’s of after-tax income. Table 2 additionally shows that the aver-
age puzzle household has a bit higher income than the average income of the full pop-
ulation, and that this is even more true for the median puzzle household compared to
the median of the full population. Table 2 also shows that the puzzle households have
sizable installment loans (mortgages not included), the larger part of which are vehicle
loans. The interest rates on these loans are typically significantly lower than on credit
cards, and there can be some contractual terms that disincentivize premature repay-
ment. Nonetheless, it is an indication that the puzzle households are also using other
precautionary borrowing channels than credit cards.
As also noted by Telyukova (2013), the puzzle households are often rather wealthy
measured in total net worth (thus also including all illiquid assets). This is to a large
degree explained by housing equity, with almost 80% of the puzzle group being home
owners. For computational reasons, our model does not include an illiquid asset, but as
shown in Kaplan and Violante (2014), a buffer stock model with an illiquid asset, and
a transaction cost for tapping into this wealth can imply that households between ad-
justments act as hand-to-mouth households. In a similar way, hyperbolic discounting
such as in Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2003) might further imply that households
“over”-accumulate illiquid assets in order to strengthen their self-control abilities and
better counteract the present bias of their future selves.
Quantitative Economics 9 (2018) Precautionary borrowing 799
Table 3. Calibration.
Parameter Value Note/Source
Income
Permanent inc. growth, Γ (annual) 102 Avg. US GDP per capita growth rate 1947–2014
Unemployment rate, u∗ 007 Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2015)
Variance of permanent shock, σ2ψ 001 · 411 Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2015)
Variance of transitory shock, σ2ξ 001 · 4 Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2015)
Unemployment benefit, μ 030 As share of permanent income, Martin (1996)
Borrowing and saving
Real interest rate on assets, ra −148% Annual, Kaplan and Violante (2014)
Interest rate spread, rd − ra 1236% Annual, Telyukova (2013) and Edelberg (2006)
Credit limit, ϕ 074 Kaplan and Violante (2014)
Collateral limit, η 000 Standard buffer-stock model
Minimum repayment share, λ 003 Standard credit card contract (quarterly freq.)
Credit access risk
Unconditional prob. of losing access, πlosex∗ 263% Fulford (2015)
Prob. of regaining access, πgainx∗ 607% Fulford (2015)
Extra risk for unemployed, χlose 4 See text
5. Calibration
5.1 First step: Calibration
The calibrated parameters are presented in Table 3. The model is simulated at a quarterly
frequency, but we discuss interest and growth rates in annualized terms. In Section 8,
we present a detailed discussion of how robust the results are to changing each single
parameter.
The gross income growth factor Γ = 102 is chosen to match US trend growth in GDP
per capita. The variances of the income shocks and the unemployment rate are all taken
from Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2015) who showed that they parsimoniously match
central empirical facts from the literature on estimating uncertain income processes. In
annual terms, the variance of both the permanent and the transitory shock are 001.20
The unemployment replacement rateμ is set to 030 as documented in Martin (1996); we
find the choice of μ= 015 in Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2015) to be too extreme.21
Regarding borrowing and saving, we first follow Kaplan and Violante (2014) who,
based on SCF data, set the real interest rate on liquid wealth to −148% (annually) and
found that the borrowing constraint binds at 74% of quarterly income. We thus set ϕ=
074, and choose η = 0 to stay as close as possible to these results (and the standard
20For the transitory shock, the variance at a quarterly frequency is simply 4× annual transitory variance,
while Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2015) showed that for the permanent shock the conversion factor
should be 411 .
21Following Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2015), we assume no persistence in unemployment, which
seems to be a valid assumption for a quarterly model given that the median unemployment duration his-
torically has been well below 12 weeks (Source: UEMPMED from the FRED database). Even the mean un-
employment duration has an historical average of only 15 weeks (Source: UEMPMEAN from the FRED
database).
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parametrization of the buffer-stock model). The interest rate on credit card debt is taken
from Telyukova (2013); she found that the mean nominal interest rate in the borrower-
saver group is 14% which we then adjust for 25 percentage points of inflation and a 062
percentage points default risk (see Edelberg (2006)). In total, this implies an interest rate
spread of 124%, which is a bit lower than the 132% spread in Fulford (2015), but larger
than the 100% spread in Telyukova (2013). We set the quarterly repayment rate λ to 003
because many credit card companies use a minimum payment rate of 1% on a monthly
basis.
For the credit access risk, we broadly follow Fulford (2015), who utilizes a proprietary
data set containing a representative sample of 01% of all individuals with a credit re-
port at the credit-reporting agency Equifax from 1999 to 2013. He estimates that each
quarter the risk of losing access to credit is 263% while the chance of regaining access
is 607%. Unfortunately, Fulford is only able to condition on general covariates such as
age, year, credit risk, geographical location, and reported number of cards. Specifically,
he does not condition on neither the actual debt accumulated nor income shocks, such
as unemployment. For our model, we need the risk of losing credit access conditional
on both the last period’s outstanding balance and unemployment status. This is further-
more necessary in order to avoid the undesirable situation that a household repaying
its credit card bill in full each month faces the same risk of losing access to new bor-
rowing as a household who continuously keeps rolling over a positive outstanding bal-
ance.22 An additional challenge for Fulford’s estimates is that they do not account for
voluntary closures of credit card accounts, which might be especially prevalent among
households without an outstanding balance. As a stark assumption, we use Fulford’s es-
timates for the risk of losing access to new borrowing for a household with a strictly
positive outstanding balance. Section 8 includes a detailed discussion of the robustness
of our results with respect to this choice.
To calibrate χlose, the factor determining the excess credit access risk for the unem-
ployed, we instead turn to the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) 2007–2009 panel where
households were asked whether or not they have a credit card in 2007 and then again in
2009. This measure of credit card access is inferior to Fulford’s, but we believe that the
two measures are rather closely related. We restrict attention to households between
ages 25 and 59, with positive income, and who in 2007 had a credit card with an out-
standing balance after the last repayment. Table 4 shows that 120% of these households
when reinterviewed in 2009 reported not having a credit card anymore; we denote this
as having “lost access.” Conditional on experiencing any weeks of unemployment, the
fraction of those who have lost access increases to 220%. Similar to Fulford, we are not
able to determine whether this indicates voluntary choices made by the households, but
Table 5 reports the odds-ratios from logit estimations controlling for both various back-
ground variables (age, age squared, minority, household size) and economic variables
(home ownership, log (normal) income, liquid assets, self-employment, education). The
effect from unemployment remains significant even when all controls are used. This
finding is in line with Crossley and Low (2013) who showed using the 1995 CanadianOut
22We thank a referee for stressing this point.
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Table 4. Lost access and unemployment—raw.
Lost Access1 Share of Sample
Percent
All 120 –
No unemployment over last year2 91 775
Any unemployment 220 225
Some unemployment (≥ 1 month) 235 206
Deep unemployment (≥ 3 months) 252 146
Source: SCF panel 2007–2009; Households between ages 25 and 59, positive income, had a credit card in 2007 with an out-
standing balance after the last repayment. Adjusted for survey weights and multiple imputations.
1Lost Access: Report not having a credit card in 2009.
2Unemployment : Sum of head and spouse over the last 12 months.
Table 5. Lost Access and unemployment—logit.
Any Unemployment Deep Unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Odds-Ratio (s.e.)
Unemployment 283∗∗∗ 330∗∗∗ 268∗∗∗ 312∗∗∗ 330∗∗∗ 278∗∗∗
(094) (106) (088) (094) (106) (102)
Single 445∗∗∗ 288∗∗ 439∗∗∗ 285∗∗
(155) (126) (153) (124)
Home owner 037∗∗∗ 039∗∗
(014) (014)
Background controls1    
Economic controls2  
Observations 695 695 695 695 695 695
Source: See Table 4. ∗ : p< 010, ∗∗ : p< 005, ∗∗∗ : p< 001.
1Background controls: Age, age squared, minority, household size.
2Economic controls: Home ownership, log (normal) income, liquid assets, self-employment, education (none, high school,
college).
of Employment Panel that current unemployment is important for explaining the share
of households answering “no” to the question “[i]f you needed it, COULD you borrow
money from a friend, family, or a financial institution in order to increase your house-
hold expenditures.”
Choosing an exact number for χlose given these observations, is, however, not
straightforward. Note, however, that if we consider a household who had access 2 years
ago (8 quarters), and was treated with some unemployment in the last year (4 quarters),
then we can calculate the theoretical odds-ratio of losing access to new borrowing if we
assume that the household never repays its credit card in full, that is, always have dt > 0.
Given the Markov processes of xt and ut , we can then easily calculate
f (xˆ uˆ)≡ E[x8 = xˆ|x1 = 0∃k ∈ {5678} : uk = uˆ] (5.1)
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such that the theoretical odds-ratio becomes
odds-ratio = f (11)/f (01)
f (10)/f (00)
 (5.2)
For χlose = 4, we get a theoretical odds-ratio of 18 for these households, which does not
seem extreme in light of the empirical evidence. Due to Fulford’s very low estimate of
gaining access, however, we still have that the risk of losing access conditional on being
affected by unemployment is 199%; if not affected by unemployment, the probability
is 124%, and in percentage points the increase is thus 75, which is again not extreme
compared to the increase we see in Table 4. We thus stick with the choice of χlose = 4,
and perform an extensive robustness analysis of this calibrations in Section 8.
5.2 Second step: Moment matching
In order to calibrate the preference parameters β (the discount factor) and ρ (the relative
risk aversion coefficient), we match selected percentiles of the distributions of liquid as-
sets and credit card debt. Specifically, we match the 5th, 15th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 85th
percentiles of both distributions. We do not target the top of the distributions because
our model is not designed to fit these, for example, matching the top of the debt distri-
bution would probably require introducing idiosyncratic borrowing constraints, while
additional saving motives must be introduced to explain why some households hold
such large amounts of liquid assets.23
In order to achieve a good fit of both the debt and liquid asset distributions, we need
to introduce preference heterogeneity. We follow Alan and Browning (2010) and assume
that the discount factor and relative risk aversion coefficient both follows translated lo-
gistic models. We assume that households have constant preferences over time, but that
there is heterogeneity across households. Specifically, we have
βij = 08+ 02 · exp(μβ + expφβ · i)1+ exp(μβ + expφβ · i)  i∼ U[01]
ρij = 1+ 10 · exp(μρ + expφρ · j)1+ exp(μρ + expφρ · j)  j ∼ U[01]
where μβ and μρ are location parameters, and φβ and φρ are dispersion parameters.24
For computational feasibility, we approximate the preference distribution with n = 5
equiprobable points in each dimension such that, (i j) ∈ [ 1/2n  1+1/2n      n−1+1/2n ]2. We
then calibrate the preference parameters by solving the following method of simulated
moments problem:
(μˆβ μˆρ φˆβ φˆρ)= arg min
μβμρφβφρ
(Λsim −Λdata)′(Λsim −Λdata) (5.3)
23Alternatively, it could be a timing issue in the data in the sense that the households reporting high levels
of liquid assets are in the process of investing these funds in more illiquid assets with higher risk-adjusted
rates of return.
24We have also experimented with ρij = 1+ 10 exp(μρ+ωβρi+expφρj)1+exp(μρ+ωβρi+expφρj) , where ωβρ is a correlation parame-
ter, but we did not find that it added any new insights.
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where Λdata contains the selected moments from the data, and Λsim is the cross-
sectional moments from a simulation with 50,000 households in each preference cat-
egory after an initial burn-in-period.25
The result is
β ∈ {09510954095809640971}
ρ ∈ {104116162311619}
which implies annual discount rates in the range 082 to 089. This is certainly in the
lower end of what is usually estimated, but higher than the calibrated choice of 079 in
Fulford (2015). The risk aversion coefficients lies in the range typically considered.
The good fit of the model is seen in the two last columns of Table 6. In all cases, the
simulated debt and liquid asset percentiles are very close to what we observe in the data
except at the extreme top, where the tails of both the credit card debt and the liquid asset
distributions are too small. This also implies that the mean levels of credit card debt and
especially liquid assets are underestimated.
6. Results
In Table 6, we see that the model, under the chosen parametrization and with a cut-
off for the grouping of 37% of mean quarterly income, can explain that about 13% of
households choose to be borrower-savers. This is substantially below, and close to half,
of the empirical estimate of 25% (see Table 1), but still a substantial share. This shows
that precautionary borrowing is at least one of the central explanations of the credit card
debt puzzle. It is especially important that such a large proportion of the puzzle group
can be explained even when the model also very closely matches the distribution of liq-
uid assets up to the 85th percentile. Furthermore, the implied size of the balance sheets
of the puzzle households is also rather large; the median puzzle household, for example,
has a credit card debt of 30% of mean quarterly income just like in the data. Unlike the
data, the debt of the median puzzle household is, however, a bit larger than its assets, but
already at the 75th percentile the simulated puzzle households have substantial positive
liquid net worth.
Table 6 also shows that 121% of the households in the simulation are in the corner
group with neither debts nor assets. This is a substantial share though only approxi-
mately half of what we see in the the data. The too small puzzle and corner groups are
instead counterbalanced by a larger borrowing group (193% in the simulation, 48% in
the data), and a larger saver group (555% in the simulation, 46% in the data).
Overall, we consider the fit of the model to be rather good, and note that the size of
both the puzzle group and the corner group could be overestimated empirically. Empir-
ically, the puzzle group is, for example, extended at expense of the borrower group by
including households who only accidentally hold some liquid assets at the survey date
25When a household dies, it is replaced with a new household without any debt and assets equal to 1
week’s permanent income, and with the same lagged permanent income as the mean of the current popu-
lation. The burn-in period is 500 periods; see, for example, McKay (2017) for a similar approach.
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Table 6. Results.
Puzzle Borrower Saver Corner All
Percent
Share 131 193 555 121 1000 SCF
Relative to Mean Quarterly Income
Credit card debt, Dt (mean) 038 035 000 000 012 017
5th percentile 006 006 000 000 000 000
15th percentile 011 011 000 000 000 000
25th percentile 016 015 000 000 000 000
50th percentile 030 027 000 000 000 000
75th percentile 050 046 000 000 014 014
85th percentile 064 058 000 000 031 033
95th percentile 092 085 000 003 060 085
Liquid assets, At (mean) 025 000 100 001 059 102
5th percentile 004 −000 006 000 000 000
15th percentile 006 −000 012 000 000 001
25th percentile 007 000 019 000 001 003
50th percentile 017 000 047 000 017 017
75th percentile 033 000 121 001 060 060
85th percentile 046 001 192 002 112 113
95th percentile 074 003 362 003 268 333
Liquid net worth, Nt (mean) −013 −034 100 000 047 086
5th percentile −069 −084 006 −002 −052 −060
15th percentile −043 −058 012 000 −024 −010
25th percentile −031 −045 019 000 −009 000
50th percentile −014 −026 047 000 012 007
75th percentile 006 −014 121 001 057 049
85th percentile 020 −010 192 002 111 102
95th percentile 049 −006 362 003 268 324
Puzzle group: DtAt > 0037. Borrower group: Dt −At > 0037. Saver group: At −Dt > 0037. Corner group: rest.
because they have, for example, either just received their paycheck or have some ex-
penses in the near future, which are not payable by credit card (e.g., rent). On the other
hand, households in the corner group might hold nonobserved liquid assets (such as
cash) or formally or informally have access to other liquid funds.
Preference heterogeneity. Figure 4 shows how the size of each group (puzzle, bor-
rower, saver, and corner) vary with the preference parameters (β, ρ). We see that the
group shares vary a lot across preferences. We see that only relatively nonrisk averse
households ever choose to be borrowers, while almost all households with a high
enough discount factor and/or risk aversion coefficient choose to be savers. The share of
puzzle households is largest for impatient households with medium levels of risk aver-
sion. These predictions fit the empirical results in Gorbachev and Luengo-Prado (2016)
very well.
Changing group definitions and risk levels. Table 7 shows the effect of changing, re-
spectively, the cut-off for the group definitions, and the credit access and income risk
parameters.
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Figure 4. Importance of preference heterogeneity. Note: Baseline parameter values in Table 3.
Vertical lines show the observed household shares from Table 1.
In rows (2) and (3), we see that when the cut-off is reduced to 0005 the size of the
puzzle group increases to about 19%. This, naturally, creates a mismatch between the
methodology used on the actual data and the simulated data, but it could be defended
using the argument that the actual data contains measurement error, while the simula-
tion data only contains much smaller approximation errors.
Rows (4) to (7), on the other hand, show that the puzzle group is reduced by about
a third if χlose (the factor determining the extra risk of losing access to new borrowing
while unemployed) is lowered from 40 to 10 without any large effects on the accumu-
lation of credit card debt and liquid assets (the three rightmost columns). Allowing for
correlation between income risk and credit access risk is thus quantitatively important,
implying that the results in Fulford (2015), all else equal, understates the size of the puz-
zle group.
A lower risk of losing access to new borrowing also substantially reduces the puzzle
group, while a larger risk enlarges it (rows (8)–(10)); here, the effects on the debt and asset
accumulation are, however, large and a full reestimation could in principle dampen (or
amplify) the change in the size of the puzzle group. A higher probability of regaining
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Table 7. Changing group definitions and risk levels.
Puzzle Borrower Saver Corner At Dt Nt
Percent Mean
Baseline 131 193 555 121 012 059 047
cut-off = 0.025 152 184 568 95 012 059 047
cut-off = 0.005 183 164 578 75 012 059 047
χlose = 10 93 250 543 114 011 058 047
χlose = 20 95 240 548 117 012 058 047
χlose = 60 141 172 562 124 012 059 048
πlose∗ = 0005 28 374 494 104 013 053 040
πlose∗ = 0010 65 310 515 110 013 055 043
πlose∗ = 0040 185 120 574 121 012 061 049
π
gain
∗ = 003 129 157 599 115 010 062 052
π
gain
∗ = 012 122 232 528 118 013 057 044
π
gain
∗ = 024 99 261 521 119 013 056 042
u∗ = 004 106 279 496 120 014 052 038
u∗ = 005 111 250 519 120 013 054 042
u∗ = 006 124 220 536 120 012 057 045
Note: Baseline parameter values in Table 3. For reference, baseline cut-off = 0037, χlose = 40, πlose∗ = 00263, πgain∗ =
00607, and u∗ = 007.
access reduces the size of the puzzle group (rows (11)–(13)), although the effect is rather
small; even when πgain∗ = 024 the puzzle group is still about 10%. Moreover, it should be
noted that experiments, not reported here, shows that it is only the belief of a high risk
of losing access, or a low chance of regaining it, which create a large puzzle group.
The final three rows of Table 7 show that if the unemployment rate is reduced from
007 to 004 the size of the puzzle group drops to 106%.
Transitions in and out of the puzzle group. Figures 5 and 6 provide further details on
what happens before and after a household enters the puzzle group (i.e., the household
is in the puzzle group at quarter k = 0 but not at k = −1). In Figure 5, we see which
group the household came from when entering the puzzle group, and which group it
exits to afterwards. We see that the short run persistence is limited as just above 40% of
the households are still in the puzzle group 1 year on (plot I). On the other hand, there is
substantial long run persistence as more than 20% of households are also in the puzzle
group 4 years later compared to the unconditional prediction of 131%; this is due to the
preference heterogeneity. The origin of the puzzle households are divided between most
borrowers (∼45%), a third savers (∼35%), and fewest from the corner group (∼20% ).
Figure 5 shows what happens to the liquid net worth and the income of the puzzle
households before they enter the puzzle group. We see that the households are deaccu-
mulating liquid net worth at an accelerating speed in the quarters before entering the
puzzle group (plot I), and that this is due to both unemployment and negative transitory
income shocks (plots II and IV). Continuing large falls in transitory income are neces-
sary to make households choose to be borrower-savers. On the other hand, plot III shows
that falls in permanent income are not necessary, because such shocks also lowers the
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Figure 5. Transitions in and out of the puzzle—groups. Sample: Households who are in the
puzzle group at k= 0, but were not so at k= −1.
optimal consumption level of the household, and thus does not induce precautionary
borrowing.
7. The welfare gain of precautionary borrowing
The welfare of the households can be measured as the ex ante discounted expected util-
ity seen from an initial period. The simulation analog of this measure can be calculated
taking the average over a sample of households experiencing different draws of shocks,
U0(P0) = P1−ρ0 ·
1
N
·
N∑
k=0
T∑
t=0
·βt ·
(
c	(skt) · Γ t ·
t∏
h=1
ψkh
)1−ρ
1− ρ 
(7.1)
T (skt d	(skt) c	(skt))⇒ skt+1
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Figure 6. Transitions in and out of the puzzle—variables. Sample: Households who are in the
puzzle group at k= 0, but were not so at k= −1.
where skt is the vector of normalized state variables of household k at age t (in quarters)
and T (•) is the stochastic transition function.26
We are now interested in the level of welfare across different values of λ, remember-
ing that as λ → 1 we return to the canonical buffer-stock model, which does not allow
precautionary borrowing. Facilitating these comparisons, we can analytically derive the
compensation in terms of a percentage increase (τ) in initial permanent income, and
thus the average future path of permanent income a household needs to receive in or-
der to be indifferent to a change in λ relative to the baseline:
U0(P0λ0)= U0
(
P0 ·
(
1+ τ
100
)
λ
)
⇔ τ
100
=
(U0(P0λ0)
U0(P0λ)
) 1
1−ρ − 1 (7.2)
26In practice, we simulate an economy with 50,000 households over 700 periods, where households who
die are replaced by new households. New households are born without debt, assets equal to one week’s
permanent income, and with the same lagged permanent income as the mean of the current population
(exactly as in the calibration exercise above, see Footnote 25). We calculate the ex ante discounted expected
utility using the last 200 periods of our simulation sample.
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Figure 7. Welfare. Note: Vertical gray line represents baseline λ value. The results are for the
median household. The vertical axis shows the compensation in percentage of initial permanent
income needed to be indifferent to the baseline. See Footnote 26 for further details.
It should be noted that this is a partial equilibrium exercise in the sense that we keep
the initial wealth new born households receive constant across the various parametriza-
tions.27 Consequently, we will focus on the relative welfare loss from losing access to pre-
cautionary borrowing compared to facing either more volatile transitory income shocks
or a higher unemployment rate.
The results for a household with median preferences are plotted in Figure 7; as λ
increases, the required compensation naturally increases as the choice set of the house-
holds only shrinks and the scope for precautionary borrowing becomes more limited.28
In total, the households need a compensating increase in the path of permanent income
of close to 12% to be indifferent between λ = 003 (the baseline) and λ = 099. Figure 7
also shows that increasing σξ from 020 to 030 implies a τ about 10%, while increasing
u∗ from 7 to 14% implies a τ about 08%. The welfare loss of losing access to precaution-
ary borrowing is thus larger than the welfare loss from a doubling of the unemployment
rate.
Figure 8 shows why the absolute compensating equivalent becomes so large in our
exercise when λ → 1. Panel (a) firstly shows that the standard deviation of normalized
consumption by age (in quarters) increases universally when λ = 003 is increased to
λ = 099. The households dislike this additional variation in consumption due to the
concavity of the utility function. From a standard Lucas-type back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation it can, however, be concluded that the welfare loss is very large relative to the
27In a general equilibrium exercise, it would be necessary to account for the fact that the buffer-stock of
one household is bequeathed and becomes the initial assets of another household. We abstract from this
dynamic here.
28We discuss welfare in terms of a household with median preferences for ease of exposition. Figure 4
showed that more than 30% of the households with median preferences are in the puzzle group.
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Figure 8. Explaining the welfare loss. Note: Figure 8 shows the standard deviation and aver-
age level of consumption by age (in quarters) in the simulation samples used to calculate the
compensating equivalents in Figure 7. See Footnote 26 for further details.
increase in the standard deviation of consumption. The central explanation for the wel-
fare loss instead is that the new-born households who do not have access to precau-
tionary borrowing need to build up a much larger buffer-stock. In panel (b) of Figure 8,
we thus see that they reduce their initial level of consumption substantially. This is only
somewhat counterweighed by a higher long-run level of consumption made possible by
the return provided by the increased buffer-stock.
8. Robustness
8.1 Growth impatience
Figure 9 shows how the size of the puzzle group (full line), the size of the borrower group
(dashed line), the average credit card debt (dashed-dotted line), and the average level of
liquid assets (dotted line) are affected by changes in the real interest rate, ra, and the
growth rate of permanent income, Γ . As in the previous section, we for simplicity focus
on a population of households with median preferences.
In understanding the figure, it is useful to consider the growth impatience factor as
defined in Carroll (2012),
β ≡ (β · (1+ ra)) 1ρ · Γ −1 (8.1)
In the perfect foresight case, a growth impatience factor less than one implies that for
an unconstrained consumer the ratio of consumption to permanent income will fall
over time. In general, a larger growth impatience factor induces saving; these savings
also satisfy the household’s precautionary motive making costly precautionary borrow-
ing less needed. Consequently, the puzzle group is increasing in Γ and decreasing in
ra. Omitting income growth, as in Fulford (2015), can thus have a sizable impact of the
model-implied size of the puzzle group for a given choice of preferences parameter.
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Figure 9. Growth impatience. Note: Vertical gray line represents baseline parameter value. The
results are for a population of households with median preferences.
In Figure 4, we likewise see that the puzzle group is decreasing in patience, β, and
eventually in risk aversion, ρ (we always have β · (1 + ra) < 1). Initially, however, an in-
crease in the curvature of the utility function (ρ) expands the puzzle group because it
implies a stronger incentive to smooth consumption, making it relatively more worth-
while for the households to pay the costs of precautionary borrowing.
Summing up, the model can explain a large puzzle group if households are impatient
enough, in a growth corrected sense, and are neither too risk neutral nor too risk averse.
8.2 Income uncertainty
The underlying motive for precautionary borrowing is to insure against transitory in-
come losses. We therefore see in Figure 10 that the size of the puzzle group is at first
increasing in the variance of the transitory income shock and risk of unemployment
(higher σξ and u∗). At some point, however, larger transitory shocks does not increase
the puzzle group because they induce too much precautionary saving. Lowering the un-
employment benefits (lower μ) likewise only initially increase the puzzle group.
A larger variance of thepermanent income shock (higherσψ), in contrast, shrinks the
puzzle group because the strengthened incentive to accumulate precautionary funds
implies that the average net worth increases so much that the households do not need
to rely on precautionary borrowing. This can also be understood as the consequence of
an increase in the uncertainty adjusted growth impatience factor,
β˜ ≡ (β · (1+ ra)) 1ρ · Γ −1 ·E[ψ−1t+1]= β ·E[ψ−1t+1] (8.2)
where the last term is increasing in the variance of the permanent shock due to Jensen’s
inequality. The same mechanism, moreover, also implies that the puzzle group is de-
creasing in higher unemployment persistence, where πuu is the unemployment risk for
the unemployed. Omitting persistent income risk, as in Fulford (2015), can thus have a
sizable impact of the model-implied size of the puzzle group for a given choice of pref-
erences parameter.
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Figure 10. Income uncertainty. Note: Vertical gray line represents baseline parameter value.
The results are for a population of households with median preferences.
8.3 Terms of borrowing
Naturally, the size of the puzzle group is decreasing if either the cost of borrowing in-
creases (higher rd − ra, fixed ra) or the repayment rate increases (higher λ). This is shown
in the two first graphs in Figure 11. Not including forced repayments, as in Fulford
(2015), can thus have a sizable impact of the model-implied size of the puzzle group.
Furthermore, the puzzle group is relatively small if the “credit limit,” ϕ, is too small, as
the extensive potential for precautionary borrowing is then limited. Allowing for gearing
in the form of a η > 0 does almost not affect the results, and our results are thus robust
in this direction.
8.4 Credit access risk
Figure 12 shows the effects of changing the unconditional probabilities for losing (π losex∗ )
and gaining (πgainx∗ ) access to new debt. In the first graph, we see that the puzzle group is
increasing in the risk of losing access, but that the effect is highly nonlinear as a higher
risk also induces more saving. The second graph shows that the puzzle group is (per-
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Figure 11. Terms of borrowing. Note: Vertical gray line represents baseline parameter value.
The results are for the households with median preferences.
haps surprisingly) also initially increasing in the probability of regaining access to credit
when it is lost; the intuition is that long expected exclusion spells induce more prior sav-
ing diminishing the need for precautionary borrowing. Afterwards a higher chance of
regaining lowers the size of the puzzle group because it makes expected spells of lost
access shorter, and thus less dangerous. It is thus clear that our results do not hinge on
the assumption of a very low probability of regaining access.
9. Conclusion
We have shown that precautionary borrowing can explain a large part of the puzzle
group of households who simultaneously hold expensive credit card debt and hold low-
return liquid assets. We have moreover shown that no knife-edge assumptions on pref-
erences or income uncertainty are needed for this result, that is, we find that the model
implies a substantial puzzle group for a broad range of assumptions regarding prefer-
ences and income uncertainty. The power of the precautionary borrowing channel is,
however, strongest if households are relatively impatient in a growth and uncertainty
814 Druedahl and Jørgensen Quantitative Economics 9 (2018)
Figure 12. Credit access risk. Note: Vertical gray line represents baseline parameter value. The
results are for a population of households with median preferences.
adjusted sense, are neither too risk neutral nor too risk averse, and are subject to sizable
transitory income shocks. Empirical results in Gorbachev and Luengo-Prado (2016) sup-
port this characterization of the puzzle group.
The strongest assumption we need in order to amplify our results is that negative
income shocks are perceived to be positively correlated with a higher risk of a fall in
the availability of credit. This is not an implausible assumption, and we provide some
indicative empirical evidence adding to that of Fulford (2015). More work on disentan-
gling demand and supply effects in these estimates is, however, needed. If credit ac-
cess risk and/or income risk is assumed to be negligible it should, however, be noted
that the precaution borrowing channel can only explain a small share of the puzzle
group.
A natural extension of our model would be to include an illiquid asset subject to
transaction costs as in Kaplan and Violante (2014). We conjecture that in such a model
precautionary borrowing will still be an important tool for both poor and wealthy hand-
to-mouth households, but fundamentally it remains an open question. Together with
a detailed life-cycle setup, such an extension is probably necessary to empirically esti-
mate the importance of precautionary borrowing with precision. This we leave for future
work. Extending the model in this direction would also make it possible to study the im-
plications of precautionary borrowing for the average marginal propensity to consume
out of both income and credit shocks. Finally, the concept of precautionary borrowing
is also relevant for understanding households utilization of other forms of consumer
loans, including car loans and mortgages.
Appendix: Solution algorithm
The purpose of the present appendix is to describe the solution algorithm in detail.
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A.1 Discretization
To facilitate solving the model, we consider a discretized version with finite-horizon:
vt(utxt dt nt) = max
dt ct
u(ct)+β ·
∑
Ωt+1(•)
s.t.
nt = nt − ct
Ωt+1(dt nt;u+x+ψξ) = (Γ ψ)1−ρ · vt+1
(
u+x+ d+(•)n+(•)
)

d+(dt;ψ) = argmin
z∈D
∣∣∣∣z− 1Γ ψ · (1− λ) · dt
∣∣∣∣
D = {0    Υ } |D| =Nd ∈N Υ > 0
n+(dt nt;u+ψξ) = 1
Γ ψ
· [(1+ ra) · nt − (rd − ra) · dt]+ ξ˜(u+ ξ)
dt ∈ D(utxt dt nt)
ct ∈ C(utxt dt nt dt)
vT (nt) = u
(
max{nt0}
)
∑
≡
∑
U×X×Ψ×Ξ
p(u+x+ψξ|utxt)= 1
where D(utxt dt nt) is the choice set for dt and C(utxt dt nt dt) is the choice set for
ct :
dt ∈
[
max{−nt0}max{dtη · nt + 1xt=0 ·ϕ}
]
 (A.1)
ct ∈
[
0 c(dt nt dt)
]

(A.2)
c(dt nt dt)≡
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
nt + dt if dt ≤ dt
nt +min
{
dt
1
η
(1xt=0 ·ϕ− dt)
}
if dt > dt
The critical step is discretizing the d+(•)-function, but we can easily verify that both a
higher Υ and/or a higher Nd do not change the optimal choice functions d
	
t (utxt dt nt)
and c	t (utxt dt nt).
The shocks are discretized using Gauss–Hermite quadrature with node sets Ψ =
Ψ(Nψ) and ξ = ξ(Nξ), where Nψ and Nξ are the number of nodes for each shock. The
lower and upper supports are ψ ≡ min(Ψ), ψ ≡ max(Ψ), ξ ≡ max(Ξ), and ξ ≡ min(Ξ).
The shock probabilities naturally sum to one, and are conditional on the ut and xt states.
A.2 State space
The discretization allows us to construct the state space starting from the terminal period
ST (uT xT ) =
{
(dT nT ) : dT ∈D nT ≥ κT (uT xT dT )
}

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(A.3)
κT (uT xT dT )= 0
and using the recursion
St (utxt) =
{
(dt nt) : dt ∈D nt ≥ κt(utxt dt)
}

κt(utxt dt)=min(Z) (A.4)
Z =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩z : ∃dt
dt ∈D(utxt dt z) and
∀(ψξu+x+) :
n+(dt z;u+ψξ)≥ κt+1
(
u+x+ d+(dtψ)
)
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ 
This procedure ensures that there for all interior points in the state space exists a set of
choices such that the value function is finite. On the contrary, such a set of choices does
not exist on the border of the state space, and the value function therefore approaches
−∞ as nt → κt(utxt dt)≥ −max{dt 1xt=0·ϕ1+η }.
A corollary is that the households will always choose dt and ct such that
nt > nt(dt)= max
x+u+ψξ
Γ ψ · [κt+1(x+u+ d+(dtψ))− ξ˜(u+ ξ)]+ (rd − ra) · dt
1+ ra  (A.5)
Note that the state space does not seem to have an analytical form, but in the limit
must satisfy
S−∞(utxt) ⊆ SL ∩ SS
SL =
{
(dn) : n >−max
{
d
1xt=0 ·ϕ
1+η
}}

(A.6)
SS =
{
(dn) : n >−(φ+φ2    )min{μξ}}
φ ≡ Γ ψ
1+ rd < 1
Outside SL the household lacks liquidity in the current period, and outside SS it is in-
solvent under worst case expectations. This is also clear from Figures 13 and 14.
The state space grid is constructed beginning with an universal dt-vector with Nd
nodes chosen such that there are relative more nodes closer to zero. For each combi-
nation of ut and xt , we hereafter construct a t-specific nt-vector as the union of (a) all
unique κt(utxt dt)-values, and (b) a nt-vector with Nn nodes beginning in the largest
κt(utxt dt)-value and chosen such that there are relative more nodes closer to this min-
imum. The grid values of nt conditional on dt is then the t-specific nt-vector excluding
all nt < κt(utxt dt), implying a total maximum of Nd +Nn nodes in the nt-dimension.
The grid is illustrated in Figure 15.
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Figure 13. State space border, κt(00 dt).
A.3 Value function iteration
The value function iteration is now given by ∀(utxt)∀(dt nt) ∈ St (utxt)
vt(utxt dt nt) = max
dt ct
c
1−ρ
t
1− ρ +β ·
∑
Ωt+1(dt nt;u+x+ψξ) (A.7)
where when t is so low that St ≈ S−∞, we could implement the following stopping crite-
rion:
(uxdn) ∈ S−∞ :
∣∣vt(uxdn)− vt+1(uxdn)∣∣≥ ζ (A.8)
where ζ is a tolerance parameter. To simplify matters, we instead always iterate T -
periods and check that our results are unchanged when increasing T .
A.4 Unconstrained consumption function
Assuming that the debt choice, dt = d, the employment status, ut = u, and the credit
market access status, xt = x, are given, the Euler-equation for the consumption choice,
ct , is
ct =
[
(1+ ra) ·β ·
∑(
Γ ψ · c	t+1
)−ρ]− 1ρ
 (A.9)
where c	t+1 = c	t+1(u+x+ d+(dψ)n+(dntu+ψξ)).
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Figure 14. State space border, κt(11 dt).
Assuming that the c	t+1-function is known from earlier iterations, the endogenous
grid point method can now be used to construct an unconstrained consumption func-
tion. The steps are:
1. Construct a grid vector of nt-values denoted
−→n with the minimum value nt(d)+ ε
(see equation (A.5)) where ε is a small number (e.g., 10−8) and of length Nn with more
values closer to the minimum.
2. Construct an associated consumption vector
−→c =
(
(1+ ra) ·β ·
∑(
Γ ψ · c	t+1
(
u+x+ d+(dψ)n+(d−→n ψξ)
))−ρ)− 1ρ

3. Construct an endogenous grid vector of nt-values by
−→
n = −→n + −→c 
4. The unconstrained consumption function, c◦uxd(nt) can now be constructed from
the association between {nt
−→
n } and {0−→c } together with linear interpolation.
Note that this can be done independently across dt ’s and does not depend on the states,
except for ut and xt which affects the expectations. This step speeds up the algorithm
tremendously because it avoids root finding completely.
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Figure 15. State space grid (ut = 0, xt = 0, t = 0).
Note that because we lack a proof of sufficiency of the Euler-equation, we cannot be
certain that
−→
n will be increasing, and thus only have unique values. If the same value is
repeated multiple times in
−→
n , the EGM-algorithm breaks down, but in practice we find
that this is never the case as long as the degree of uncertainty is “large enough.”
A.5 Choice functions
The consumption choice can now be integrated out, and the household problem written
purely in terms of the debt choice, that is,
v(utxt dt nt) = max
dt∈D(ut xt dt nt )
(
c•(•))1−ρ
1− ρ
+β ·
∑
Ωt+1(dt nt;u+x+ψξ)
s.t.
(A.10)
nt = nt − c•(•)
c•(utxt dt nt dt) = min
{
c◦utxt dt (nt) c(utxt dt nt dt)
}

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c(utxt dt nt dt) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
nt + dt if dt ≤ dt
nt +min
{
dt
1
η
· (1xt=0 ·ϕ− dt)
}
if dt > dt
This problem can be solved using a grid search algorithm over a fixed dt-grid with step-
size dstep, such that c◦ut xt dt (nt) is a simple look-up table. This has to be done for all pos-
sible states, but it is possible to speed this up by utilizing some bounds on the optimal
debt choice function. Specifically, we use that given
d	(utxtΥnt) = dΥ  (A.11)
d	(utxt0nt) = d0 (A.12)
d	(utxt dd=d0 nt) = d0 (A.13)
we must have
∀dt ∈ [dΥ : Υ ] : d	(utxt dt nt) = dΥ  (A.14)
∀dt ∈ [d0 : dΥ )ε≥ 0 : d	(utxt dt + εnt) ≥ d	(utxt dt nt) (A.15)
∀dt ∈ (0 d0) : d	(utxt dt nt) ≤ d0 (A.16)
∀dt ∈ [0 : dd=d0 ] : d	(utxt dt nt) = d0 (A.17)
Over ut , xt , and nt the problem is jointly parallelizable. The value function is evaluated in
the nt+1-dimension29 by “negative inverse negative inverse” linear interpolation, where
the negative inverse value function is interpolated linearly and the negative inverse of
the result is then used; this is beneficial because the value function is then equal to zero
on the border of the state space.
Note that the grid search needs to be global because we otherwise might find multi-
ple local extrema and because there might be discontinues due to the nonconvex choice
set. This directly give us d	(utxt dt nt) and, therefore, also
c	(utxt dt nt)= c•
(
utxt dt nt d
	(utxt dt nt)
)
 (A.18)
A.6 Implementation
The algorithm is implemented in Python 2.7, but the core part is written in C parallelized
using OpenMP and called from Python using CFFI. Only free open source languages and
programs are needed to run the code. The code files are available in the supplementary
file on the journal website, http://qeconomics.org/supp/604/code_and_data.zip.
Table 8 shows the parametric settings we use. Our results are robust to using even
finer grids.
29The other dimensions are fully discretized.
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Table 8. Algorithm settings.
Parameter Value
Nodes for transitory income shock, Nξ 4
Nodes for permanent income shock, Nψ 4
Nodes for beginning-of-period debt, Nd 80
Nodes for beginning-of-period net wealth, Nn 80
Nodes for net wealth grid vector (−→n ), Nn 40
Value used to calculate minimum of net wealth grid vector, ε 10−8
Step-size of fixed debt grid, dstep 5 · 10−3
Number of iterations, T 120
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